In part one I argued that convenience is the bait, and that doing things the hard way is worth the friction. I also conceded Cory Doctorow’s point: individual choices won’t fix enshittification. Policy will. This post covers why GrapheneOS needs that policy to survive, who is actually writing it, where they should point it next, and what you can do to help.

If I had a dollar for every eye-roll my refusals have earned me, my new phone would have cost me nothing. My partner’s arrives whenever I say “no, I’m not on WhatsApp”. My tech colleagues have their own version, usually when I explain, again, that I’m not on Twitter, or X, or whatever its owner has decided to call it this week. Friends ask why I can’t just use the family group chat like a normal person. Collaborators send me Facebook event links and then a second message, slightly weary, with the same details in plain text.

Last time I wrote here about stepping back from Flickr, I said the part worth carrying forward wasn’t the app, it was a practice: license generously, credit properly, treat a photo as something meant to be shared rather than hoarded. I left an obvious question sitting there, unanswered on purpose: shared with whom, and for what. “Everyone who takes photos” isn’t a real audience, and I don’t want to spend a small, community-funded project’s limited attention building for one that doesn’t exist.

So here’s an honest attempt at an answer, and it starts by naming who I’m deliberately not building for.

I’ve had a Flickr account since 2008. My own photostream sits past 4,800 photos now, and for a long stretch of that history it wasn’t just a place I put my own pictures. In February 2009 I wrote a HOWTO on this blog about posting straight from a Nokia S60 phone to Flickr, because, as I put it at the time, “a lot of my clients in the educational sector are starting to use Flickr as part of their online teaching.” I wasn’t a bystander watching open education discover Flickr. I was helping build the on-ramp for it, in a professional life spent almost entirely in EdTech, first at DETAFE, then building learning management systems at Brightcookie for over a decade.

Then, in 2011, I wrote a different kind of post on this blog, “Facebook - good riddance!”, deleting my account and declaring myself done with a company I’d never trusted. I illustrated it with a Creative Commons photo pulled straight off Flickr, credited to a photographer going by cogdogblog. That habit, reaching for a CC-licensed Flickr image whenever this blog needs one, has held for 15 years since, and it’s still the workflow described in this site’s own editorial instructions today.

This isn’t that kind of post. I’m not celebrating anything.

Earlier this year, in The Hidden World of Corporate IoT Spying, I looked at how consumer gadgets quietly turn personal spaces into corporate data collection nodes: robot vacuums mapping living rooms for foreign servers, smart TVs cataloguing every frame you watch, and Eufy security cameras quietly beaming unencrypted thumbnails and facial identifiers to the cloud despite marketing slogans promising “local storage for your eyes only.”

Seven months later, that trajectory has only accelerated. The news cycle around domestic cameras and automated surveillance has moved from occasional security quirks to systemic betrayal.

There are two dominant ways to think about who should govern artificial intelligence.

The market frame says: the data, the models, and the compute are private goods, owned by the organisations that assembled them, exchanged through contract and property rights. Governance follows ownership. OpenAI owns GPT-4. Google owns Gemini. These are products. Markets will sort it out.

The state frame says: AI is too consequential to leave to markets, so regulators must impose rules from above. The EU’s AI Act is the most developed version of this: binding requirements, conformity assessments, registration databases, penalties for violations.

€264 billion. That is how much European organisations spend annually on digital technology from non-European companies. And that number increases by roughly 10% every year, not because the products are getting better at the same rate, but because licence agreements are structured that way, and because the switching costs are designed to make leaving expensive. Some vendors have raised prices tenfold. The organisations paying them have, in most cases, no meaningful governance over the systems they depend on.

In 1976, Bill Gates wrote an open letter to hobbyists accusing them of stealing. What they were actually doing was sharing software they had written for each other (modifications, tools, documentation), the way people had shared knowledge since the first person showed another how to do something useful. Gates reframed mutual aid as intellectual property theft. It was not a philosophical claim. It was a property claim, backed by lawyers, Congress, and eventually the World Trade Organization.

A commercial telco and a mesh network are not different ways of solving the same problem. They are built on opposite assumptions about how infrastructure works. Understanding why that matters is the key to understanding why regional Australia keeps getting left behind, and what to do about it.

The Economics of Absence

In regional and rural areas, the connectivity gap is not a failure of effort or ambition. It is the predictable output of a particular economic model.

A few months ago, I wrote about the growing graveyard of “smart” home devices, expensive bits of plastic and silicon that turned into bricks the moment a corporate server in Virginia or San Francisco was switched off. It’s a personal annoyance when your $300 security hub stops talking to your lightbulbs. Scale that logic up to national defence and critical infrastructure, and the stakes shift from a darkened living room to a crippled nation.

I’ve spent 30 years watching tech cycles come and go, from the first dial-up modems in rural Austria to the mesh networks I’m currently stringing across the Australian bush. Each time a “next big thing” arrives, we see the same pattern: a frantic rush to centralise, followed by a slow, painful enclosure of what should have been a common resource.

The current noise around AI in open source feels different. It feels heavier. There’s a justified fear that AI-generated code is hollowing out our commons. Maintainers are being buried under a drift of unvetted, mediocre pull requests, while a handful of platform monopolies strip-mine decades of community work to feed their proprietary black boxes.

We live in an era where a reliable connection to the digital world is not a luxury, but a lifeline. It’s how we work, learn, access essential services, and connect with our communities. Yet for many in regional and rural Australia, this lifeline is frayed, unreliable, or simply non-existent. We’ve been told to accept a digital landscape dominated by a handful of corporate giants, a landscape where postcodes dictate the quality of our connection to the modern world. But what if there’s another way?